We introduce a generalized Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) key establishment protocol (KEP) for magmas. This leads to the foundation of non-associative public-key cryptography (PKC), generalizing the concept of non-commutative PKC. We show that left selfdistributive systems appear in a natural special case of a generalized AAG-KEP for magmas, and we propose, among others instances, concrete realizations using fconjugacy in groups and shifted conjugacy in braid groups. We discuss the advantages of our schemes compared with the classical AAG-KEP based on conjugacy in braid groups.
Introduction
Currently public key cryptography still relies mainly on a few number-theoretic problems, namely integer factorization [RSA78] and the computation of discrete logarithms in Z × p and over elliptic curves. The systems based on these problems remain unbroken. Nevertheless, after the advent of quantum computers, systems like RSA [RSA78] and its variants (e.g. [Ra79] ), Diffie-Hellman (DH) [DH76] , ElGamal [El85] and ECC [Mi85, Ko87] will be broken easily [Sh97, PZ03] . Under the label Post Quantum Cryptography, there have been several efforts to develop new cryptographic primitives which may also serve for the post quantum computer era. Here we focus on key establishment protocols (KEP's) as cryptographic primitives, because they are the most important and the hardest to construct. Note that, using hash functions, it is easy to build public key encryption schemes from KEP's. One approach became later known as non-commutative cryptography. Recall that the involved algebraic structures in the number-theoretic systems are commutative groups and rings. In non-commutative cryptography these are replaced by non-commutative groups and rings, and we consider computational problems therein. One may say that, roughly, the discrete logarithm problem is replaced by the conjugacy problem and its variants. After some precursors, in particular [WM85], non-commutative cryptography was mainly established in a few seminal papers around the turn of the millenium [AAG99, KL+00, CK+01] . Of particular importance is the ingenious Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld (AAG) Commutator KEP which only exists in the non-commutative setting, while the systems in [KL+00, CK+01] may be considered as staightforward non-commutative analogues of the classical DH-KEP. Since they admit efficiently computable normal forms and a supposedly hard conjugacy problem, braid groups were explicitly suggested as platform groups for these systems. Nevertheless, explicit specifications of these systems in braid groups as well as most other non-commutative cryptosystems have been broken over the last decade. This led to some understandable decline of interest in non-commutative cryptography inside the main cryptographic community. A revival of non-commutative cryptography may be achieved by means of research in one of the following two directions. The first approach is to stick with the suggested protocols and search for better platform groups. One may even keep braid groups as platforms and search for families of hard instances of the conjugacy problem that can be efficiently generated. Note that the main reason why braid-based cryptosystems have been broken is the fact that "randomly" generated keys turned out to be a very bad choice. This situation is quite typical for public-key cryptography. Consider, for example, the familiar RSA scheme where the keys have to be chosen with care. Another approach is to construct new or generalized non-commutative cryptosystems which are based on other or supposedly harder computational problems. In this and some subsequent papers we pursue the latter approach. In particular, we broaden the scope of non-commutative cryptography as we go beyond non-commutative, associative binary oparations -we utilize non-associative binary operations, i.e. magmas. Thus, we hope to establish the field of nonassociative public-key cryptography. In particular, we generalize the AAG-KEP for monoids to a general AAG-KEP for magmas.
Outline. The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we emphasize the important and integrating role of the AAG protocol in non-commutative and commutative cryptography. In particular, we introduce a generalized notion of AAG-KEP for monoids (section 2.1), and we show that not only the AAG commutator KEP for groups [AAG99] (section 2.2), but also the Ko-Lee et al. protocol, the group Diffie-Hellman protocol (section 2.3), and even the classical DH-KEP (section 2.5) are special instances of that generalized AAG scheme. Furthermore, we also subsume the Sakalauskas, Tvarijonas and Raulynaitis KEP(STR-KEP), a natural hybrid of the classical DH-KEP and the KoLee-KEP, as a further instance (section 2.6). The main innovative part of this paper is contained in the sections 3 and 4. In particular, in section 3.1 we extend the generalized AAG-KEP from monoids to magmas. Here finitely generated submonoids are replaced by f.g. submagmas, and Alice and Bob know their secret key submagma elements as products of the generators, including planar rooted binary trees describing the bracket structure of such products. First examples of instances of the generalized AAG-KEP for magmas are a non-associative KEP based on simultaneous double coset problem and symmetric decomposition problem (see sections 3.2 and 3.3). The most interesting and natural instances of the generalized AAG-KEP for magmas come from left-selfdistributive (LD) systems and their generalizations (section 4). In section 4.1 we introduce LD-and multi-LD-systems with fconjugacy in groups and shifted conjugacy in braid groups as key examples for LD-operations. The nonassociative AAG f -commutator KEP (section 4.2) and the AAG shifted commutator KEP (section 4.3) are discussed as major examples. We note that for these instances we may even drop the simultaneity of the underlying base problems (f -and shifted conjugacy problems), because here submagmas generated by one element still have a rich and complicated structure and a hard membership problem. This implies that these systems are the first couragement, constant interest and steadfast patience. In particular, his great interest in non-associatve algebraic structures as well as public key cryptography formed the scientific environment that made me bring these subjects together. I am greatly indebted to P. Dehornoy who introduced an authentication scheme based on his notion of shifted conjugacy [De06] . This in the first place inspired me to come up with a KEP based on shifted conjugacy and in the course of this work to invent non-associative cryptography. 2 Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key establishment
AAG key establishment protocol for monoids
Here we use and describe a slightly generalized version of the AAG key establishment protocol for monoids [AAG99] . Though it is easy to introduce further generalisations, the following notion will suffice for our purposes. For this general AAG key establishment protocol for monoids we need sets S 1 , S 2 , two feasible monoids (M, · M ), (N, · N ), and functions
which satisfy the following conditions:
(2) For i = 1, 2, it is, in general, not feasible to determine a secret x ∈ S i from the knowledge of y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y k ∈ M and β i (x, y 1 ), . . . , β i (x, y k ) ∈ N .
(3) For all x ∈ S 1 and y ∈ S 2 : γ 1 (x, β 2 (y, π 1 (x))) = γ 2 (y, β 1 (x, π 2 (y))).
Furthermore Alice and Bob select elements s 1 , . . . , s m , t 1 , . . . , t n ∈ M . These elements are public, and they define submonoids S A = s 1 , . . . , s m and S B = t 1 , . . . , t n of M . Now Alice and Bob have to perform the following protocol steps:
1. Alice generates an element a ∈ S 1 such that π 1 (a) ∈ S A , and Bob chooses a b ∈ S 2 s.t. π 2 (b) ∈ S B .
2. Alice computes the elements β 1 (a, t 1 ), . . . , β 1 (a, t n ) and publicly announces this list. This list is her public key. Analogously Bob computes the elements β 2 (b, s 1 ), . . . , β 2 (b, s m ) and publishes this list.
3. Knowing that π 1 (a) = r 1 · · · r k with r i ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s m } for some k ∈ N and i = 1, . . . , k, Alice computes from Bob's public key β 2 (b, π 1 (a)) =
Alice computes
, and symmetrically Bob com-
Because of (3), the equivalence K A = K B holds in the monoid N . Now any key extractor φ defined on the monoid N provides a shared key φ(K A ). Here a key extractor is any effectively computable function from a monoid to any keyspace 1 (compare with [AAG03] ). A key extractor may be given by a normal form algorithm in the monoid, but in general the key extractor map needs not be injective. Anyway, for brevity we will refer in the sequel to the monoid element K := K A ∈ N as the shared key. Alice's secret key is the pair (a, I) ∈ S 1 × {1, . . . , m} k where I denotes the index vector (I 1 , . . . , I k ) such that r i = s Ii for i = 1, . . . , k, i.e., I determines a word over {s 1 , . . . , s m } representing π 1 (a) ∈ S A . Analogously Bob's secret key is a pair (b, J) ∈ S 2 × {1, . . . , n} k ′ The AAG key agreement scheme is formulated in a too general manner to be applied. For practical purposes we have to specify the sets S 1 , S 2 , the monoids M, N and the functions β i , γ i , π i for i = 1, 2. Setting S 1 = S 2 = M , β 1 = β 2 and π 1 = π 2 = id M , we recover the original AAG key establishment protocol for monoids [AAG99] as a special case of this generalized notion.
AAG commutator KEP for groups
The AAG commutator KEP for groups [AAG99] is determined by the following specifications: Let S 1 = S 2 = M = N = G be a group, and S A and S B are assumed to be subgroups of G 2 . We have π 1 = π 2 = id G and β 1 = β 2 =: β. The functions β, γ 1 , γ 2 : G 2 → G are defined by
Note that the shared key is the commutator
1 A standard key space is the semigroup of bitstrings {0, 1} * . 2 Now r i and u j are elements from {s If the group elements are given by representative words (over some alphabet of generators) as usual in combinatorial group theory, then multiplication is defined by simple concatenation of words. Therefore Alice and Bob have to publish the words representing the elements β(a, t i ) = a −1 t i a and β(b, s j ) = b −1 s j b in a disguised form. Therefore the question, whether one can efficiently disguise elements by using defining relations [SZ06], is very important for any platform group. One way is to use efficiently computable normal forms. Such efficiently computable normal forms exist in many groups, e.g., in braid groups. Furthermore, the conjugator search, i.e. determining x from β(x, y) = x −1 yx, was assumed to be hard in braid groups. Therefore Anshel, Anshel and Goldfeld suggested braid groups as platform groups for the AAG commutator KEP [AAG99] . 
Group Diffie-Hellman key establishment
we obtain the original Ko-Lee et al. protocol [KL+00] . In [AAG03] it is shown that the Ko-Lee et al. protocol may be seen also as an instance of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld KEP for monoids. The following proposition is a straightforward generalization of that claim from [AAG03] using the same proof idea 3 .
Proposition 2.1. The group Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol is an instance of the general Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld KEP for monoids.
This turns N into a monoid. We define the functions
Then condition (1) is satisfied obviously. Indeed, given the forgetful operation on N , any constant function β(u) : G → N provides a monoid homomorphism. Further, condition (2) holds, because it is assumed to be hard for the
The computational problem is a search version of the Double Coset Problem or Decomposition Problem (DCP) -see also section 2.4. We define the functions
This proves that the conditions (1)-(3) are fulfilled. It remains to show that the protocol steps 1.-3. of the DH-KEP are specializations of the protocol steps 1.-4. of the general AAG-KEP. Set S A = S B = x and define, for i = 1, 2,
.e., π 1 , π 2 are constant functions.
Alice generates an element
2. Alice computes the element β 1 (a, x) = a 1 xa 2 = y A and publicly announces this element. This element is her public key. Analogously Bob computes the element β 2 (b, x) = b 1 xb 2 = y B and publishes this element.
3. Knowing that π 1 (a) = x, Alice computes from Bob's public key β 2 (b, π 1 (a)) = β 2 (b, x) = b 1 xb 2 . Indeed, this computation is trivial, because here β 2 (b, π 1 (a)) is Bob's public key. And Bob, knowing π 2 (b) = x, computes from Alice's public key β 1 (a, π 2 (b)) = β 1 (a, x) = a 1 xa 2 . Also this computation is trivial. Therefore, here protocol step 3 becomes redundant.
Alice computes
We have proven that the group DH-KEP is a special case of the AAG-KEP for monoids. Nevertheless, not every special case is obvious. Indeed, the group DH-KEP does not use the homomorphy property (1) at all. Therefore step 3 in this specification of the general AAG-KEP (see proof above) became trivial. This observation motivates us to introduce the following somehow informal notion:
Definition 2.2 We call a key establishment protocol AAG-like if it is an instance of the general AAG-KEP and it utilizes property (1) in a non-trivial way.
According to this notion, and contrary to the AAG commutator KEP, the group Diffie-Hellman KEP is not an AAG-like KEP, though it can be formally considered as an instance of the general AAG-KEP (see Proposition 2.1).
Base Problems
The following search problems are related with the group based protocols from the previous sections. Let G be a group.
l-simCSP (l-Simultaneous Conjugacy Search Problem):
. . , m} with x ∈ A and y ∈ B. Objective: Find K := x −1 y −1 xy.
KLP (Ko-Lee Problem -a Diffie-Hellman version of the GCSP or CDP):
Indeed, the AAG commutator KEP, the Ko-Lee protocol and the group DH-KEP are based on the AAGP, KLP and DH-DCP, respectively. Now, let P 1 , P 2 be two computational problems. We say P 1 is harder than P 2 or P 1 implies P 2 , written P 1 → P 2 , if a P 1 -oracle provides a solution to problem P 2 . Proposition 2.3. We have the following hierarchy of search problems:
Proof. Most of the sketched implications are obvious consequences of the definitions. We just prove CDP → KLP and l-ssCSP → AAGP:
1. (see [KL+00] ) The input is a triple (s, s x , s y ) ∈ G 3 with x ∈ A, y ∈ B, and A, B ⊂ G with [A, B] = 1. A CDP-oracle provides (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ A 2 with x 1 sx 2 = s
x . Now we can compute the shared key
Therefore we have [c a , c b ] = 1, and we can compute the shared key
We see, that solving the classical CSP is insufficient for breaking the AAG protocol or the Ko-Lee protocol. Furthermore, it is, in general, insufficient to solve the l-SCSP to obtain the shared key K of the AAG protocol [SU06] :
be the output of a m-SCSP-oracle and a k-SCSP-oracle, respectively. Then we have
or vice versa), the adversary gets K ′ = K. Alternatively, the adversary could solve the SCSP and the
to break the AAG key agreement scheme [SU06] : If a m-SCSP-oracle outputs a x ′ = c b x ∈ A, then the MSP-oracle provides the word expression x ′ (a 1 , . . . , a k ). Now the adversary can compute the shared key
But we have shown above, that it is not necessary to solve the MSP.
Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol
Recall the classical Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol [DH76] . Let G be a cyclic group and x an element of big order in G. Alice and Bob have to perform the following protocol steps.
1. Alice chooses a k ∈ Z, computes y A = x k , and sends it to Bob. And Bob chooses a l ∈ Z, computes y B = x l , and submits it to Alice.
Alice receives y B and computes K
And Bob receives y A and computes the shared key
The Diffie-Hellman key establishment protocol is an instance of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld KEP for monoids. Furthermore it is a AAG-like KEP.
Proof. Here we set S 1 = S 2 = Z and M = N = S A = S B = x . For i = 1, 2, we define the functions β i , γ i : Z × x → x and π i : Z → x by
Then, for i = 1, 2, condition (1) holds for all y 1 , y 2 ∈ M , because M = x is cyclic, and therefore abelian:
. Note that exponentiation is only a homomorphism if the monoid M is abelian. Further, condition (2) holds, because it is assumed to be hard to determine k ∈ Z from β(k, x) = x k . The computational problem is well known as the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). And (3) is satisfied, because we have for all k, l ∈ Z:
This proves that the conditions (1)-(3) are fulfilled. It remains to show that the protocol steps 1.-2. of the Diffie-Hellman KEP are specializations of the protocol steps 1.-4. of the general AAG-KEP.
Alice generates an element
2. Alice computes the element β 1 (k, x) = x k = y A and publicly announces this element. This element is her public key. Analogously Bob computes the element β 2 (l, x) = x l = y B and publishes this element.
3. Knowing that π 1 (k) = x k , Alice computes from Bob's public key β 2 (l,
Since this is exactly the output of the computation in step 3, here step 4 is redundant or trivial.
Let us recall and emphasize that in step 3 the homomorphy property (1) is used in a nontrivial way. For example, Alice knowing
can compute
Therefore, we may view the classical DH-KEP as an AAG-like KEP.
Sakalauskas, Tvarijonas and Raulynaitis Key Establishment Protocol (STR-KEP)
The following KEP is a natural hybrid of the classical DH-KEP and the KoLee-KEP. It was introduced in 2007 by Sakalauskas, Tvarijonas and Raulynaitis in [STR07] Let G be a (noncommutative) group and A, B a pair of commuting subgroups in G. Furthermore, let x be a "generic" element in G. Alice and Bob have to perform the following protocol steps.
1. Alice generates her secret key (k, a) ∈ Z × A. And Bob selects his private
2. Alice computes y A = a −1 x k a and sends it to Bob. And Bob computes y B = b −1 x l b and submits it to Alice.
3. Alice receives y B and computes K A := a −1 y k B a. And Bob receives y A and computes the shared key
Proposition 2.5. The Sakalauskas, Tvarijonas and Raulynaitis Key Establishment Protocol is an instance of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld KEP for monoids. Furthermore, it is an AAG-like KEP.
Proof. Here we set S 1 = Z × A, S 2 = Z × B, M = S A = S B = x and N = G. For i = 1, 2, we define the functions β i :
Then, for i = 1, 2, condition (1) holds for all y, y ′ ∈ M :
Further, condition (2) holds, because it is assumed to be hard to determine
The computational problem is a "mixed problem" requiring to solve simultaneously the DLP and the CSP (see [STR07] ). And (3) is satisfied, because we have for all k, l ∈ Z, a ∈ A, b ∈ B:
Alice generates an element
2. Alice computes the element β 1 ((k, a), x) = a −1 x k a = y A and publicly announces this element. This element is her public key. Analogously Bob computes the element β 2 ((l, b), x) = b −1 x l b = y B and publishes this element.
3. Knowing that π 1 (k, a) = x k , Alice computes from Bob's public key
Let us recall and emphasize that also here in step 3 the homomorphy property (1) is used in a nontrivial way. For example, Alice knowing
Therefore, we may view the STR-KEP as an AAG-like KEP.
3 Key establishment using non-associative operations 3.1 AAG scheme for magmas
Monoids are proposed as algebraic platform structures for the AAG key agreement protocol in [AAG99] . But the monoid structure is only used in the AAG scheme in order to guarantee that the secret key, e.g. Alice's key a, is an uniquely defined product of some given generators {s 1 , . . . , s m }, i.e. a = r 1 · r 2 · · · r k with r i ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s m } for all i. It is, of course, no problem to introduce brackets in this expression in order to handle nonassoziative operations. Therefore, there exists a straightforward generalization of the AAG scheme from monoids to magmas.
A magma (sometimes also called grupoid) (M, * ) is a set M equipped with a binary operation * on M , i.e. a function M × M → M . Note that there are no relations, which have to be satisfied by the elements of M . The notion of a magma was introduced by N. Bourbaki (see, e.g., [Bo74] ). We describe the AAG key establishment protocol in the -for our purposesmost general manner. For i = 1, 2, let S i be a sets and (M, • i ) and (N, • i ) be magmas, i.e. there are two operations on the sets M, N , respectively. For i = 1, 2, we need functions
which satisfy the following three conditions: io
(2) It is, in general, not feasible to determine a secret x ∈ S i (i = 1, 2) from the knowledge of
Consider an element y of a magma (M, •) which is an iterated product of other elements in M . Such an element can be described by a planar rooted binary tree T whose k leaves are labelled by these other elements y 1 , . . . , y k ∈ M . We use the notation y = T • (y 1 , . . . , y k ). Here the subscript • tells us that the grafting of subtrees of T corresponds to the operation •. Now, it is easy to prove by induction that any magma homomorphism β :
for all y 1 , . . . , y k ∈ M . In particular, the magma morphisms β 1 (x, ·), β 2 (x, ·) (x ∈ S) fulfill this property. Alice and Bob publicly assign sets {s 1 , . . . , s m }, {t 1 , . . . , t n } ⊂ M , respectively. The secret key spaces SK A , SK B of Alice and Bob are subsets of S 1 , S 2 , respectively, and they depend on these public elements. It is sufficient that β 1 , β 2 fulfill condition (1) only for all x ∈ SK A , SK B , respectively, and that condition (3) holds for all a ∈ SK A , b ∈ SK B . Now, Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
1. Alice generates her secret key a ∈ SK A , and Bob chooses his secret key b ∈ SK B .
2. Alice computes the elements β 1 (a, t 1 ) , . . . , β 1 (a, t n ) ∈ N , and sends them to Bob. Analogously Bob computes the elements β 2 (b, s 1 ), . . . , β 2 (b, s m ) ∈ N , and sends them to Alice.
3. Alice, knowing π 1 (a) = T •1 (r 1 , . . . , r k ) with r i ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s m }, computes from Bob's public key
And Bob, knowing
with u j ∈ {t 1 , . . . , t n }, computes from Alice's public key
4. Alice computes K := γ 1 (a, β 2 (b, π 1 (a))). Bob also computes the shared key
Note that the protocols described in section 2.1 are special instances of this general AAG like protocol for magmas. A natural special case of this scheme is given by M = N = S 1 = S 2 . This implies that the functions β i , γ i , for i = 1, 2, induce further binary operations on M . If additionally • i = • i holds for i = 1, 2, then M satisfies some distributive laws. This will lead to the notion of LD-and multi-LD-systems (see section 4). Another specification of our general magma-based scheme is discussed in the next subsection.
3.2 Non-associative KEP based on simultaneous DCP
Specifications
We consider the following specifications of the AAG scheme for magmas: Let G = M = N be a group, and set S 1 = S 2 = G 2 . The group multiplication symbol in G will usually be omitted. The operations • i , • i (i = 1, 2) on G are defined by
and the functions β 1 , β 2 : G 2 × G → G are defined by
β(x, ·) fulfills the homomorphy condition (1), for all x = (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ G 2 , because
1 (x 1 y 1 x 2 ) = x 1 (y 1 y −1 2 y 1 )x 2 = β((x 1 , x 2 ), y 1 • y 2 ). Alice and Bob publicly assign sets {s 1 , . . . , s m }, {t 1 , . . . , t n } ⊂ G, respectively. The secret key spaces of Alice and Bob are SK A = G × S A and SK B = S B × G, where S A = s 1 , . . . , s m • and S B = t 1 , . . . , t n • denote submagmas of (G, ((x 1 , x 2 ) , y) = x 1 y, γ 2 ((x 1 , x 2 ), y) = yx 2 .
These definitions satisfy condition (3), because
We skip repeating all the protocol steps from section 3.1 with these specifications. The base problem for these non-associative scheme is discussed in the next subsubsection.
A related non-commutative scheme
Consider the right part of Alice's key a r = T • (r 1 , . . . , r k ) ∈ S A with r i ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s m }. If we view a r as a word in the s i 's, then we observe that a r is self-reverse and the exponent signs of a r alternate, beginning and ending with a positive sign. For example, we have
While in this scheme alternating exponent signs are essential to gurantee that condition (1) holds, the self-reverse property seems to be superflous. It comes from the self-reverse property of the non-associative operation •. Anyway, for example in order to compute b l a r b r , Alice actually doesn't need to know a r as a tree-word in the submagma s 1 , . . . , s|m • . Rather it suffices to know a r as an "alternating" word of the form
Therefore, we give up this restricted key choice and define modified (bigger) secret key spaces by SK A = G × SK 
Then, Alice and Bob have to perform the following protocol steps.
1. Alice generates her secret key (a l , a r ) ∈ G × SK 2l r 2l+1 with r i ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s m }, computes from Bob's public key
2l ′ u 2l ′ +1 with u j ∈ {t 1 , . . . , t n }, computes from Alice's public key
4. Alice computes K := a l (b l a r b r ). Bob also computes the shared key (a l b l a r )b r = K.
It is easy to show that this scheme is a further instance of the generalized AAG scheme for monoids (section 2.1). Therefore one simply has to turn the sets SK
(r)
A and SK
(l)
B into monoids by introducing some "forgetful" operations as exercised, e.g., in the proof of 2.1. In order to break this scheme an attacker obviously has to solve the following
A successful attack on Alice's secret key requires the solution of the following n-simDP (n-Simultaneous Decomposition Problem): A . Therefore, a solution to both problems provides the attacker with the shared secret, because
Here the first and the last equality hold, because b
B and a r ∈ SK (r) A , respectively. Alternatively, we can use equality chain
where here the first and the last equality hold, because a B × G to the m-simDP. Analogously, the second equality chain shows us, that it is sufficient to find a solution (a
A to the n-SDP and a solution (b
Note that the knowledge of one secret key, e.g. Alice's key (a l , a r ) ∈ G × SK (r)
A , is not sufficient for an attacker to obtain the shared secret K, because he needs not only a r expressed in the generators of the group G, but rather an expression of the form a r = r 1 r Remark. An attacker might approach an n-simDP instance {(t i , t
order to solve for a l or a r , respectively. For example, in the latter case, we have
Therefore, either the simultaneous (subgroup)-CSP has to be hard in G, or, if the simCSP is (at least heuristically) approachable in G, it is recommended that the sets {t −1 i t j | 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n} and {t i t −1 j | 1 ≤ i = j ≤ n} have large centralizers. This may be ensured by if the set {t 1 , . . . , t n } itself has a large centralizer, an thus also S B .s Similarly S A should have a large centralizer.
Non-associative KEP based on simultaneous symmetric DP
Here we consider the following specifications of the AAG scheme for magmas: Let k, l ∈ N be G = M = N = S 1 = S 2 be a group. The group multiplication symbol in G will usually be omitted. The operations • i , • i (i = 1, 2) on G are defined as in the previous subsection by
and the functions β 1 , β 2 : G × G → G are defined by
β i (x, ·) (i = 1, 2) fulfills the homomorphy condition (1) for all x ∈ G, because
where either k = 1 or l = 1. Alice and Bob publicly assign sets {s 1 , . . . , s m }, {t 1 , . . . , t n } ⊂ G, respectively.
The secret key spaces of Alice and Bob are the submagmas S A = s 1 , . . . , s m • and S B = t 1 , . . . , t n • of (G, •) generated by the publicly assigned elements.
The projections π 1 , π 2 are the identity id G , and the functions γ 1 , γ 2 : G×G → G are defined by γ 1 (x, y) = x k y, γ 2 (x, y) = yx l .
These definitions satisfy condition (3), which gives the shared key
Consider the simultaneous version of symmetrical decomposition problem (see [CDW07] ).
Input: Integers (k, l) ∈ Z 2 and element pairs (t 1 , t
Objective: Find elements a ′ ∈ G with a ′k t j a ′l = t ′ j for all j = 1, . . . , n. We conclude that an attack on Alice's or Bob's private key has to master an n-sim (k, 1)-SDP or an m-sim (1, l)-SDP, respectively.
Remark. One may also consider a variant of that KEP where the integers k, l are parts of Alice's and Bob's secrret key. In particular, set S 1 = S 2 = Z×G,
Then an attack, e.g. on Alice's secret key, has provide k ∈ Z and a ∈ G such that a k t j a = t 1. An LD-system (S, * ) is a set S equipped with a binary operation * on S which satisfies the left-selfdistributivity law
Definition 4.2. (Section X.3. in [De00]) Let I be an index set. A multi-LDsystem (S, ( * i ) i∈I ) is a set S equipped with a family of binary operations ( * i ) i∈I on S such that
is satisfied for every i, j in I. Especially, it holds for i = j, i.e., (S, * i ) is an LD-system. If |I| = 2 then we call S a bi-LD-system.
A classical example for an LD-system is given by a group G equipped with the conjugacy operation x * y = x −1 yx. We also mention the Laver tables (Chapter X in [De00]) as standard examples for finite monogenic LD-systems. Many examples for LD-, bi-LD-and multi-LD-systems are given in Dehornoy's monography [De00] .
f -conjugacy
One may consider several generalizations of the conjugacy operation as candidates for natural LD-operations in groups. Consider an Ansatz like x * y = f (x −1 )g(y)h(x) for some group endomorphisms f, g, h.
Proposition 4.3. Let G be a group, and f, g, h ∈ End(G). Then the binary operation x * y = f (x −1 ) · g(y) · h(x) yields an LD-structure on G if and only if
Proof. A straightforward computation yields
A comparison of both terms yields the assertion.
The simplest solution of the system of equations (1) is f = g and h = id. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 4.4. (LD-or f -conjugacy) Let G be a group, and f ∈ End(G).
Remark. For any non-trivial endomorphism f , the relation −→ * f defines not an equivalence relation on G. Even the relation −→ * defined by u −→ * v iff ∃f ∈ Aut(G) s.t. u −→ * f v is not an equivalence relation. Indeed, transitivity requires the automorphisms (relation must be symmetric!) to be an idempotent endomorphism (f 2 = f ) which implies f = id. Compare the notion of f -LD-conjugacy with the well known notion f -twisted conjugacy defined by u ∼ f v (for f ∈ Aut(G)) iff ∃c ∈ G s.t. v = f (c −1 )uc =: c * tw f u, which yields indeed an equivalence relation. On the other hand, the operation * tw = * tw f is not LD -rather it satisfies the following "near" LD-law:
where α f is short for f (α). Anyway, it follows directly from the definitions that u −→ * v if and only if f (u) ∼ f v, i.e., any f -LD conjugacy problem reduces to a twisted conjugacy problem and vice versa. Here we have to extend the notion of twisted conjugacy from f ∈ Aut(G) to all f ∈ End(G).
Shifted conjugacy
Patrick Dehornoy introduced the following generalization of f -conjugacy, and he points out, that once the definition of shifted conjugacy is used, braids inevitably appear [De00, De06] . De00] ) Consider a group G, a homomorphism f : G → G, and a fixed element a ∈ G. Then the binary operation
yields an LD-structure on G if and only if [a, f 2 (x)] = 1 for all x ∈ G, and a satisfies the relation af (a)a = f (a)af (a). Hence the subgroup H = {f n (a) | n ∈ N} of G is a homomorphic image of the braid group
with infinitely many strands, i.e., up to an isomorphism, it is a quotient of B ∞ .
There exists a straightforward generalization of Proposition 4.5 for multi-LD-systems: Proposition 4.6. Let I be an index set. Consider a group G, a family of endomorphisms (f i ) i∈I of G, and a set of fixed elements
is a multi-LD-system if and only if
Proof. A straightforward computation gives
Note that this proof also contains proofs of Proposition 4.5 (setting |I| = 1) and of the following Corollary 4.7 (setting G = B ∞ , I = {1, 2}, s = ∂, * 1 = * , * 2 = * , a 1 = σ 1 and a 2 = σ −1 1 ).
Consider the injective shift endomorphism ∂ :
Corollary 4.7. (Shifted conjugacy, Example X.3.5. in [De00] ) B ∞ equipped with the shifted conjugacy operations * , * defined by
1 · ∂y · x is a bi-LD-system. In particular, (B ∞ , * ) is an LD-system.
Generalized shifted conjugacy in braid groups
In the following we consider generalizations of the shifted conjugacy operations * in B ∞ . Therefore we set f = ∂ p for some p ∈ N, and we choose a i ∈ B 2p for all i ∈ I such that
Since a i ∈ B 2p , we have [a i , ∂ 2p (x)] = 1 for all x ∈ B ∞ . Thus the conditions of Proposition 4.6 are fulfilled, and x * i y = x∂ p (y)a i ∂ p (x −1 ) defines an multi-LDstructure on B ∞ . For |I| = 1, p = 1 and a = σ 1 , which implies H = B ∞ , we get Dehornoy's original definition of shifted conjugacy * . It remains to give some natural solutions {a i ∈ B 2p | i ∈ I} of the equation set (1). Note that in case |I| = 1 (notation: a 1 = a), of course, every endomorphism f of B ∞ with f (σ 1 ) ∈ B 2p provides such solution a = f (σ 1 ).
Definition 4.8 (Definition I.4.6. in [De00] ) Let, for n ≥ 2, be δ n = σ n−1 · · · σ 2 σ 1 . For p, q ≥ 1, we set
, it provides a lot of (multi)-LD-structures on B ∞ . Proposition 4.10 Let be p, p 1 , p 2 ∈ N with p 1 + p 2 = p. The binary operation The proofs of Proposition 4.9 and 4.10 are straightforward computations. The reader is recommended to draw some pictures.
Yet another group-based LD-system
Though we are sure that it must have been well known to experts, we haven't been able to find the following natural LD-operation for groups in the literature. For a group G, (G, •) is an LD-system with x • y = xy −1 x. Note that, contrary to the conjugacy operation * , for this "symmetric decomposition" or conjugacy operation •, the corresponding relation −→ • defined by x −→ • y iff ∃c ∈ G such that y = c • x) is not an equivalence relation. In particular, −→ • is reflexive and symmetric, but not transitive. One may consider several generalizations of this symmetric conjugacy operation •, as candidates for natural LD-operations in groups. Consider an Ansatz like x • y = f (x)g(y −1 )h(x) for some group endomorphisms f, g, h.
Proposition 4.11. Let G be a group, and f, g, h ∈ End(G). Then the binary operation x • y = f (x) · g(y −1 ) · h(x) yields an LD-structure on G if and only if
Except for f 2 = f = g = h = h 2 , the simplest solutions of the system of equations (3) are f 2 = f = g and h = id, or f = id and g = h = h 2 .
Corollary 4.12. (LD-or f -symmetric conjugacy) Let G be a group, and f ∈ End(G) an endomorphism that is also a projector (
Proposition 4.13. Let G be a group, and f, g ∈ End(G). (i) Then the binary operations • f and * f (and
In short, the following equations hold.
(ii) The operations • f and * f ( * 
Non-associative AAG f -commutator KEP
Now we consider the most natural special case of our general AAG scheme for magmas (see section 3.1). Let be M = N = S. This implies that the functions β i , γ i , for i = 1, 2, induce further binary operations on M . In particular, we introduce the notation x * i y = β i (x, y). Now, the homomorphy condition (1) (in section 3.1) reads as
If • i = • i holds for i = 1, 2, then M fulfills two distributive laws. And if additionally • 2 = • 1 = * 1 = * 2 =: * , then (M, * ) is an LD-system. We observe that LD-systems occur in a very natural special case of the general AAG scheme for magmas. Nevertheless, this does not imply that we get by that construction KEP's for all LD-systems. Indeed, in order to obtain a shared key, we have to specify the projections π 1 and binary operations γ i which themselves depend on the specification of the LD-operation * . In the following we set π i = id M for i = 1, 2. Now, we establish a (non-associative) AAG-KEP for groups with f -conjugacy as LD-operation. Let M = G be a group, f ∈ End(G), then (G, +) with * = * f (see Def. 4.4) is an LD-system according to Proposition 4.3.
Definition 4.14. (f -commutator) Let G be a group, and f ∈ End(G). The f -commutator of an ordered pair (u, v) ∈ G × G is defined by
The AAG f -commutator KEP is given by the following further specifications of the general AAG scheme for magmas (section 3.1).
Now, Alice and Bob perform the following protocol steps.
1. Alice generates her secret key a in the public submagma S 1 = s 1 , · · · , s m * of (G, * ), and Bob chooses his secret key b ∈ S 2 = t 1 , · · · , t n * .
2. Alice computes the elements a * t 1 , . . . , a * t n ∈ G, and sends them to Bob. Analogously Bob computes the elements b * s 1 , . . . , b * s m ∈ G, and sends them to Alice.
3. Alice, knowing a = T * (r 1 , . . . , r k ) with r i ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s m }, computes from Bob's public key
And Bob, knowing b = T ′ * (u 1 , . . . , u k ′ ) with u j ∈ {t 1 , . . . , t n }, computes from Alice's public key
Alice computes
In order to break this scheme an attacker obviously has to solve the following base problem.
f -AAGP (f -Commutator AAG-Problem): Let (G, * ) be a group with α * β = f (α −1 β)α for some f ∈ End(G). Furthermore, let A = a 1 , . . . , a k * and B = b 1 , . . . , b m * be two f.g. submagmas of (G, * ).
. . , m} with x ∈ A and y ∈ B.
But a successful attack on Bob's secret key requires at least the solution of the following 
Another approach is to attack (additionally to Bob's secret key) also Alice's key, i.e., to solve for the n-simultaneous f -CSP-instance {(t j , t ′ j )} j≤n with t
a. An oracle to that problem provides an element a ′ ∈ G such that t
Then the attacker hopes that computation of the
Though the f -CSP seems to be particulary interesting for non-invertible endomorphism f ∈ End(G), here we compare K ′ with K for the simplest case where f ∈ Inn(G), i.e., there exists an element p ∈ G s.t. f (x) = p −1 xp. Then it is easy to show that
We conclude that
. Therefore, even in the case of f ∈ Inn(G), we can't hope to reduce the f -AAGP to a simultaneous subgroup CSP, as we have done it for the classical AAGP in Proposition 2.3. Nevertheless, as in the remark at the end of section 3.2.2, one may approach an n-sim f -CSP instance {(t i , t ′ i )} i≤n by considering the n 2 -simCSP instance
Indeed, here we have
Therefore, either the simultaneous CSP has to be hard in G, or, if the simCSP is (at least heuristically) approachable in G, it is recommended that the sets {t
have large centralizers. This may be ensured by if the set {t 1 , . . . , t n } itself has a large centralizer. Similarly {s 1 , . . . , s m } should have a large centralizer.
An example in pure braid groups
Here we a concrete suggestion for the group G and the endomorphism f ∈ End(G). Let G be the n-strand pure braid group P n . For some small integer d ≥ 1, consider the epimorphism η d : P n −→ P n−d given by 'pulling out' (or erasing) the last d strands, i.e. the strands n − d + 1, . . . , n. Recall the shift map ∂, and note that ∂ d (P n−d ) ≤ P n . Now, we define the endomorphism f : P n −→ P n by the composition f = ∂ d • η.
Non-associative AAG shifted commutator KEP in braid groups
Here we establish a (non-associative) AAG-KEP for braid groups with shifted conjugacy as LD-operation. Recall from Corollary 4.7 that the braid group (B ∞ , * , * ) forms a bi-LD-system. Also recall the definition of shift endomorphism ∂.
Remark. Note that we actually do not need a bi-LD-system, like (B ∞ , * , * ), in order to build a AAG shifted commutator KEP. Indeed, two LD-operations, namely x * y = ∂(x −1 )σ 1 ∂(y)x and its reverse x * rev y = x∂(y)σ 1 ∂(x −1 ), suffice. Here (B ∞ , * , * rev ) is not a bi-LD-system. Alice and Bob choose a ∈ s 1 , . . . , s m * and b ∈ t 1 , . . . , t n * rev , and send {a −1 * rev t j } j≤n and {b −1 * s i } i≤m , respectively. Then they may compute
Analogeously, one may build an AAG f -commutator KEP using * f and its reverse operation. Non-simultaneity. Analogeous to the remarks in sections 3.2.2 and 4.2, an attacker might approach an m-sim shCP instance {(s i , s
Therefore, either it is recommended that the set {s
has large centralizer. This may be ensured by if the sets {s 1 , . . . , s m } and {t 1 , . . . , t n } itself have a large centralizer. Another strategy is to abandon simultaneity, i.e, to consider the critical case m = n = 1. Note that only for shifted conjugacy (and its generalizations) we have opportunity to abandon simultaneity because only here the submagmas s * , s * generated by one element are nontrivial. This is not the case for f -conjugacy or the LD-operation • from section 4.1.5.
Generalized shifted conjugacy. It is straightforward to construct nonassociative KEP's using generalized shifted conjugacy operations. We leave this to the reader.
Generalizations, further work and open problems

AAG-schemes over non-associative and non-commutative algebras
It is possible to generalize the AAG-KEP for magmas from section 3.1 in several ways. One generalization is very simple -just replace the magmas (M,
for some index sets I 1 , I 2 , i.e. we introduce further binary operations. In particular, in the special case given by M = N = S 1 = S 2 and π 1 = π 2 = id M , Alice chooses her secret key a as an element from the submagma s 1 , . . . , s m {•1,i}i∈I 1 .
To describe an element of such a submagma it is not sufficient to know the planar rooted binary tree T (providing the bracket structure) and the leaf elements r 1 , . . . , r k ∈ {s 1 , . . . , s m }, but we also need to assign binary operations (from the set {• 1,i } i∈I1 ) to the internal nodes of the tree T . For example, In the following we write T {•1,i}i∈I 1 , and we assume that T is then a planar rooted binary tree accompanied with such an assignment of its internal nodes.
Here we have to modify condition (1) from section 3.1 in the obvious way:
If β 1 , β 2 are defined by a binary operation from a bi-or multi-LD-system, then condtion (1') is satisfied by construction. Now one may build KEP's with this obvious modification. One example is the AAG shifted commutator KEP for the bi-LD-system (B ∞ , * , * ). Indeed, there Alice and Bob may have choosen their secret keys from s 1 , · · · , s m * , * of (B ∞ , * , * ) and t 1 , · · · , t n * , * , respectively. Recall that bi-and multi-LD-systems fulfill more homomorphic properties (i.e. distributive laws) than is necessary to build a KEP. As an example, consider the group ring ZG. Recall that (G, * f ) is an LD-system for any f ∈ End(G). By construction, (ZG, * f , +) is a non-commutative and non-associative algebra. It is straightforward to build a non-associative KEP over ZG analogous to the non-associative AAG f -commutator KEP. The only modification is that we choose the secret keys a ∈ s 1 , · · · , s m * f ,+ and b ∈ t 1 , · · · , t n * f ,+ for s 1 , · · · , s m , t 1 , · · · , t n ∈ ZG. Analogoulsly, it is straightforward to build a non-associative KEP over the nonassociative bialgebra (ZB ∞ , * , * , +). Furthermore, one could consider non-commutative (but associative) special cases of these KEP's over non-associative algebras, if one restricts the secret keys a, b (or more precisely the projectio n π 1 (a), π 2 (b)) to s 1 , · · · , s m + and b ∈ t 1 , · · · , t n + , respectively.
Open problems and further work
• The AAG-KEP for magmas (see section 3.1) describes a general framework for building non-associative key establishment protocols. Our main examples are provided by LD-operations (f -conjugacy in groups and shifted conjugacy in braid groups). Recall also the systems based on (simultaneous) symmetric DP employing the non-associative operation given by x • y = xy −1 x. Find other interesting instances of the general AAG-KEP for magmas (see section 3.1).
• Find other platform groups for the non-associative AAG f -commutator KEP (see section 4.2).
In particular, solve the (simultaneous) f -conjugacy problem in pure braid groups for the endomorphism f described in section 4.2.1.
• How rigid are the solutions to the f -conjugacy problem in pure braid groups and the shifted conjugacy problem in braid groups? Note that, contrary to the f -conjugacy problem in pure braid groups, there exists a solution to the shifted conjugacy problem in braid groups [KLT09] .
• Investigate heuristic attacks, especially length-based attacks [HT02, GK+05] , on the submagma MSP for non-associative LD-operations * in braid groups.
Of particular interest is here the non-simultaneous case m = 1 which emerges only for non-associative operations. I.e. consider the submagma MSP for the submagma s 1 * generated by only one element.
• Recall the important special case of the AAG-KEP for magmas where S = M = N is an LD-system. Depending on the LD-operation * , we constructed for some instances non-associative KEP's by specifying the functions γ i (i = 1, 2). It would be nice to have non-associative KEP's for all LD-systems. Such non-associative KEP's for all LD-systems, bi-LD-and multi-LDsystems (in general: sets with distributive operations) have been constructed -see our forthcoming paper [KaT12] . There we have to go even a step beyond the general AAG-KEP for magmas, and we introduce a small asymmetry in the non-associative AAG protocol. Indeed, we consider the systems and instances given in [KaT12] as more practical and interesting than the one given in this paper. Since the KEP's given in [KaT12] work for all multi-LD-systems, they deploy two further advantages.
(1) We can consider encryption functions using iterated * -multiplication from the left. In order to obtain the secret key an attacker has to solve then an iterated f -or shifted conjugacy problem.
(2) For a given (partial) multi-LD-system (M, { * i } i∈I ) it turns out that even the used operations * i can be hidden, i.e., they are part of the secret key.
• Develop other primitives like signature and authentication schemes in nonassociative cryptography.
Here we concentrated on KEP's which are usually the hardest to construct. Note that, using hash functions, it is easy to build public key encryption schemes from KEP's.
• For infinite groups, like braid groups, there are limitations on the depths of the trees describing a submagma element . Consider for example fconjugacy in an infinte group G where f ∈ End(G) satisfies |f (x)| ≤ |x| for all x ∈ G. Denote by | · | = | · | X the word length over some given generating set X of G. We conclude that |x * f y| ≤ |f (x −1 )| + |f (y)| + |x| ≤ 2|x| + |y| ≤ 3 max{|x|, |y|}.
Now, consider the following two extreme cases of trees with k leaves defining the bracket structure of a magma element in s 1 , . . . , s m * ( * = * f ).
The left comb (r j ∈ {s i } i≤m for all j = 1, . . . k) LC(r 1 , . . . , r k ) := r 1 * (r 2 * (r 3 * · · · r k−2 * (r k−1 * r k ) · · ·)), and the right comb RC(r 1 , . . . , r k ) := ((· · · (r 1 * r 2 ) * r 3 * · · · * r k−2 ) * r k−1 ) * r k .
If |s i | ≤ l 0 for all i = 1, . . . , m, then one may show by induction that |LC(r 1 , . . . , r k )| ≤ (2k − 1)l 0 , |RC(r 1 , . . . , r k )| ≤ (2 k − 1)l 0 .
I.e. we can only prove an exponential (in k) upper bound on the word length of a magma element of tree depth k − 1. But for left combs we have a linear upper bound. In practice, one may consider as keys either only elements of small tree depth, or we choose such elements whose bracket structure defining trees have a small "distance" from a left comb. Define a proper notion of "distance" of planar rooted binary trees, and investigate how the word length growth for trees with "small distance" from the left comb LC. Determine a method how such trees can be generated efficiently.
• Recently B. Tsaban developed a deterministic polynomial time attack on the AAG commutator KEP in linear groups [Ts12] which also applies to several other non-commutative schemes. In short, Tsaban's linear centralizer attack exploits the fact that in classical AAG-KEP the shared key is the commutator K = a −1 b −1 ab. So, if we find solutions (up to centralizer elements) inside the centralizer of the centralizer of, say S A , then these centralizer elements cancel and we recover K, even if these solutions were only in the linear matrix group in which we embed our linear group. But for KEP's with shared key K = a l b l a r b r , or K being an f -commutator in groups or a shifted commutator in braid groups, these centralizer elements would not cancel. Therefore, we conclude that, in its present state the linear centralizer attack does not apply to most of the non-associative schemes presented in this paper. Can the linear centralizer attack be improved to make it work against these KEP's? 
